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KEITH E. WHITTINGTON*
ABSTRACT
During the Bush presidency, presidential signing statements be-
came briefly controversial. The controversy has faded, but the White
House continues to issue statements when signing legislation. Those
statements frequently point out constitutional difficulties in new
statutes and sometimes warn that the executive branch will adminis-
ter the statutes so as to avoid those constitutional difficulties. This
Article argues that the criticisms of signing statements were mostly
misguided. Signing statements as such present few problems and
offer some benefits to the workings of the American political system.
While there might be reason to object to the substantive constitutional
positions adopted in any given signing statement, signing statements
as such are mostly unobjectionable. Although it might be preferable
for Presidents to veto constitutionally problematic legislation,
modern legislative practices have made the veto power less useful
and rendered signing statements more useful.
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Princeton University.
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INTRODUCTION
The final years of the presidency of George W. Bush were
absorbed by a variety of constitutional controversies over the scope
and exercise of presidential power. Among the more fleeting of these
controversies was the dust-up over presidential signing statements.1
Critics took the White House to task for its extensive use of state-
ments issued upon signing a piece of legislation.2 Such statements
have traditionally served a variety of functions, but the Bush Ad-
ministration was particularly aggressive in its use of the statements
to outline its many constitutional objections to legislative provisions
that were being signed into law.3 As the Administration complained
that Congress was passing statutes that impinged on the Presi-
dent’s own constitutional prerogatives,4 critics of the Administration
responded by complaining that the President was asserting a dicta-
torial power to sit in judgment of the constitutionality of Congress’s
handiwork.5
In this Article, I argue that the controversy over the Bush-era
signing statements as such was much ado about nothing. The cri-
tiques of the signing statements were mostly overblown and misdi-
rected.6 Indeed, there might well be some benefits to the practice of
recording constitutional objections to legislation in signing state-
ments.7 But the debate tended to obscure what might be useful and
what might be objectionable about signing statements and gave
inadequate consideration to the possible alternatives to this use of
signing statements.8
1. See TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33667, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATE-
MENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 7 (2012).
2. See id. at 8.
3. See Michael T. Crabb, Comment, “The Executive Branch Shall Construe”: The Canon
of Constitutional Avoidance and the Presidential Signing Statement, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 711,
716 (2008).
4. See GARVEY, supra note 1, at 8.
5. See CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE
SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 229-30 (2007).
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.
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Signing statements were once a fairly obscure type of presidential
document of relatively little consequence or controversy.9 By virtue
of the Bush-era controversies, the concept is at least more familiar,
even if the actual documents themselves continue to have a low
profile.10 Often, signing statements have been primarily celebratory
and political.11 Accompanied by formal ceremonies, brief signing
statements provide an opportunity for credit claiming for policy
accomplishments.12 President Ronald Reagan gathered with con-
gressional leaders on the South Lawn of the White House a few days
before the 1986 midterm elections in order to “sign[ ] the most
sweeping overhaul of our tax code in our nation’s history.”13 In 1964,
President Lyndon B. Johnson gathered congressional and civil
rights leaders in the East Room of the White House to watch him
issue a televised address upon his signing of the Civil Rights Act.14
On less momentous occasions, Presidents have simply issued a
written statement commemorating their actions, as when President
Herbert Hoover informed the country that he had signed a bill
authorizing the transfer of juvenile delinquents to local jurisdic-
tions, as recommended by a presidential commission and with the
“active interest and approval of social workers all over the coun-
try.”15 In other cases, Presidents use signing statements to voice
their continuing objections to features of the new legislation, as
when President Richard Nixon issued a statement that began, “To
avoid any possible misconceptions, I wish to emphasize that section
601 of this act ... does not represent the policies of this Administra-
tion.”16 The President would not fail to sign the 1971 Military
9. See Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive
Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 308 (2006).
10. See id.
11. See Christopher S. Kelley & Bryan W. Marshall, The Last Word: Presidential Power
and the Role of Signing Statements, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 248, 250-51 (2008).
12. See Christopher S. Kelley & Bryan W. Marshall, Going It Alone: The Politics of Sign-
ing Statements from Reagan to Bush II, 91 SOC. SCI. Q. 168, 169 (2010).
13. Remarks on Signing the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1414, 1414 (Oct. 22,
1986).
14. Radio and Television Remarks Upon Signing the Civil Rights Bill, 2 PUB. PAPERS 842,
842 (July 2, 1964).
15. Statement on Signing a Bill Authorizing the Transfer of Juvenile Delinquents to Local
Jurisdictions, 1932 PUB. PAPERS 258, 259 (June 11, 1932).
16. Statement on Signing the Military Appropriations Authorization Bill, 1971 PUB.
PAPERS 360, 360 (Nov. 17, 1971) [hereinafter Signing Statement Nov. 17, 1971].
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Appropriations Authorization Bill, but he continued to protest the
inclusion of language calling for the announcement of a “final date”
for the withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia.17
For current purposes, the more interesting signing statements
are those that mount constitutional arguments connected to the
legislation in question and disclose presidential views about future
implementation of its provisions. Sometimes, Presidents hope to put
a particular spin on legislation they support as when President
Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a statement indicating that the Alien
Registration Act of 1940 “should be interpreted and administered”
so as to protect “the loyal aliens who are [our nation’s] guests” from
hostile local communities as well as to protect the nation at large
from “aliens who are disloyal and are bent on harm to this coun-
try.”18 In other cases, signing statements might provide a road map
of constitutional concerns as when upon signing the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act, President George W. Bush announced his
expectation “that the courts will resolve these legitimate legal ques-
tions as appropriate under the law.”19 Of course, most notoriously,
President George W. Bush frequently filled signing statements with
the ominous words: “The executive branch shall construe these
sections in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of
the President.”20
The discussion that follows reveals the extent to which criticism
leveled at even the most notorious signing statements appears un-
founded. In Part I, I outline how signing statements have been used
and describe the recent controversy surrounding them. This section
identifies the major objections raised by politicians, journalists,
lawyers, and scholars against Presidents voicing constitutional
objections in signing statements. In Part II, I argue that the objec-
tion to signing statements has tended to confuse the message with
the messenger. At heart, the objection does not appear directed to
signing statements as such but to presidential efforts to interpret
17. Id. (quoting Act of Nov. 17, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-156, § 601, 85 Stat. 423, 430 (1971)).
18. Statement on Signing the Alien Registration Act, 1940 PUB. PAPERS 64, 64 (June 29,
1940).
19. Statement on Signing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 1 PUB. PAPERS
503, 503 (Mar. 27, 2002).
20. E.g., Statement on Signing the Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency
Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005, 3 PUB. PAPERS 2504, 2504 (Oct. 13, 2004).
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the Constitution in the context of their role as chief executive. In
Part III, I turn to the potential virtues of presidential signing state-
ments as an instrument for announcing such constitutional views
and presidential intentions regarding implementation. Finally, in
Part IV, I turn to the use of the presidential veto to block constitu-
tionally defective legislation.
I. THE OBJECTION TO SIGNING STATEMENTS
Though not specifically anticipated by the U.S. Constitution, pres-
idential signing statements have been a long-standing feature of
American political practice.21 The Constitution only requires two
statements from Presidents. First, Presidents are expected to pro-
vide Congress “from time to time” with “Information of the State of
the Union.”22 In practice, this duty has been fulfilled with an annual
message, or, since the Woodrow Wilson Administration, by the oral
delivery of the State of the Union address.23 Second, Presidents are
also required to issue a message to Congress when vetoing a bill so
that Congress may “enter the Objections at large on their Journal,
and proceed to reconsider it.”24 Of course, ever since George Washing-
ton’s Administration, Presidents have sent Congress a variety of
special messages on a range of topics on different occasions. Early
Presidents did not routinely issue a statement upon signing bills
into law, but in 1830, Andrew Jackson issued the first true signing
statement.25 After signing a bill appropriating funds to extend a
road from Detroit to Chicago, President Jackson stated, “I desire to
be understood as having approved this bill with the understanding
that the road authorized by this section is not to be extended beyond
the limits of [the federal territory of Michigan].”26
21. See Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving
the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 929-30 (1994).
22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
23. Gerhard Peters, State of the Union Addresses and Messages, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/sou.php [https://perma.cc/PY8G-NLNQ].
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
25. GARVEY, supra note 1, at 2.
26. President Andrew Jackson, Special Message (May 30, 1830), http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=66775 [https://perma.cc/MPE5-MN87].
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Such statements were relatively uncommon early in the nation’s
history but have become increasingly common in the twentieth
century.27 Their use has ranged from the innocuous to the contro-
versial.28 The ceremonial and the credit-claiming uses are particu-
larly innocuous. With the rise of modern mass media, Presidents
have seen particular political benefit in advertising the performance
of their routine constitutional duty of signing bills into law.29
Presidents emphasize their active participation in the lawmaking
process—and their pivotal role in bringing policy into being—by
calling attention to their decision to approve and sign legislation.30
Presidents steal at least part of the spotlight from legislators by
claiming popular laws as their own.31 The President’s signature not
only completes the constitutional procedure for passing legislation
but also stamps the President’s name on public policy. Congressmen
might be able to informally name legislation after themselves, but
only the President can create a photo op in the Rose Garden or the
East Room.
More controversial are the efforts to use signing statements to
accomplish policy goals, rather than political goals. Those policy
goals might be either legislative or constitutional.32 From a legisla-
tive perspective, Presidents have used signing statements to clarify,
elaborate, or assert what an Administration views as the significant
policy implications of the signed bill.33 This effort by Presidents to
add to the legislative history of a statute by announcing the “pres-
idential intent”34 is most notable if what Presidents are adding is at
odds with what various legislative sponsors might have thought
would be the effect of the statute’s language. From a constitutional
27. See May, supra note 21, at 929-30.
28. Crabb, supra note 3, at 712-13.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill ... shall, before it become a Law, be presented
to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it.”).
30. See Kelley & Marshall, supra note 11, at 250-51.
31. See May, supra note 21, at 930 n.304.
32. See id. at 930 (noting the use of signing statements as an opportunity for the President
to call for additional legislation from Congress to supplement or adjust the bill signed into
law).
33. See Bradley & Posner, supra note 9, at 314.
34. Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, to the Litig. Strategy Working Grp. 3 (Feb. 5, 1986), http://
www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-269/Acc060-89-269-box6-SG-LSWG-
AlitotoLSWG-Feb1986.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7LQ-KX2L].
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perspective, Presidents have used signing statements to raise con-
stitutional objections or concerns about new statutes.35 Andrew
Jackson’s statement regarding the internal improvements project in
Michigan is such a case.36
Congress might have once regarded such presidentially issued
statements as objectionable but seems to have eventually acceded
to the practice. Former President John Quincy Adams wrote a blis-
tering report for the House of Representatives denouncing President
John Tyler for issuing a signing statement casting doubt on the
constitutionality of a Whig-sponsored apportionment bill.37 Adams
denounced Tyler’s statement as “a defacement of the public re-
cords.”38 The next few Presidents were at least apologetic when they
broke protocol to issue written statements calling into question
Congress’s handiwork.39 But, a few decades later, Presidents were
issuing signing statements at a rapid pace.40 By the time of Herbert
Hoover’s presidency, signing statements had been routinized and
cataloged, and Hoover himself issued sixteen statements explicit-
ly designated as such.41 Twentieth-century legislators were unlikely
to view such statements as a stain on the public records. And Pres-
idents in the twentieth century increasingly turned to signing
statements to articulate and advance a constitutional vision of ex-
pansive executive power.42
Signing statements became briefly controversial again during the
Reagan Administration. The Reagan Administration did not issue
signing statements at a particularly high rate,43 but the Admini-
tration was more self-consciously concerned with what signing
35. See Bradley & Posner, supra note 9, at 313.
36. See Jackson, supra note 26.
37. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 177 & n.38
(2007).
38. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 27-909, at 2 (1842)).
39. See May, supra note 21, at 929-30, 929 n.297.
40. See id. at 931 tbl.2, 932.
41. This number was caculated using the catalog of modern presidential signing state-
ments at AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/signingstatements.php
[https://perma.cc/DL6K-ALM2].
42. See Kevin A. Evans, Looking Before Watergate: Foundations in the Development of the
Constitutional Challenges Within Signing Statements, FDR-Nixon, 42 PRESIDENTIAL STUD.
Q. 390, 402-03 (2012).
43. See May, supra note 21, at 931 tbl.2.
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statements could do.44 The Department of Justice under Attorney
General Edwin Meese was more vocal about the appropriateness of
and need for the executive branch to independently interpret the
Constitution, and signing statements were one vehicle for promoting
the executive’s constitutional vision.45 Notably, as then Deputy As-
sistant Attorney General Samuel Alito put it, the Department of
Justice’s “primary objective is to ensure that Presidential signing
statements assume their rightful place in the interpretation of
legislation.”46 Alito further noted that the Reagan Department of
Justice “should seek to have interpretive signing statements issued
for a reasonable number of bills,” with the hope that those state-
ments would become part of the legislative history that judges
would turn to when interpreting and applying statutes.47 Democrat-
ic Representative Barney Frank called this “the gravest usurpation
of legislative prerogative I can think of.”48 Strong claims on behalf
of interpretive signing statements were criticized for a time, but
eventually the debate receded as interpretive signing statements
were normalized.49
A new debate over signing statements emerged during the pres-
idency of George W. Bush. As a Congressional Research Service
report observed, the Bush White House used signing statements in
ways that were comparable to how previous Administrations—both
44. See id. at 930-31, 931 n.304; see also William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential
Legislative History: A Critique, 66 IND. L.J. 699, 703-09 (1991).
45. Bradley & Posner, supra note 9, at 316.
46. Alito, supra note 34, at 1.
47. Id. at 4.
48. See Frank B. Cross, The Constitutional Legitimacy and Significance of Presidential
“Signing Statements,” 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 209, 209 (1988) (quoting Linda Greenhouse, Wash-
ington Talk: The White House; In Signing Bills, Reagan Tries to Write History, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 9, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/09/us/washington-talk-the-white-house-in-
signing-bills-reagan-tries-to-write-history.html [https://perma.cc/PDP8-XZ97]).
49. For the Reagan-era debate, see generally Legal Significance of Presidential Signing
Statements, 17 Op. O.L.C. 131 (1993) (analyzing the useful and legally significant functions
of presidential signing statements); Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing
Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power,
24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363 (1987) (arguing that courts should not use presidential signing
statements as a tool for interpreting congressional intent); Popkin, supra note 44 (examining
judicial reliance on presidential signing statements); Brad Waites, Note, Let Me Tell You What
You Mean: An Analysis of Presidential Signing Statements, 21 GA. L. REV. 755 (1987) (ana-
lyzing the policy of publishing presidential signing statements).
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Democratic and Republican—had used them.50 But the report noted
that, “while the nature and scope of the [constitutional] objections
[to legislation] raised by the Bush II Administration mirrored those
of prior Administrations, the sheer number of challenges contained
in the signing statements” proved anomalous.51 To critics, the “innu-
merable” objections to statutory provisions felt merely “ritualistic”
and “mechanical,” demonstrating little executive deliberation or
deference to legislative sensibilities.52 The Bush Administration did
not emphasize the kind of interpretive signing statements that the
Reagan Administration hoped would shape how judges understood
statutes.53 Instead, the Bush White House used signing statements
to advance constitutional understandings that the executive branch
would use itself in crafting the implementation of statutes.54 In do-
ing so, the Bush Administration highlighted signing statements as
an example of presidential unilateral action, which was a concept of
increasing interest and concern in the context of a polarized and
divided government.55
As the once-obscure device of a signing statement became more
visible during the Bush Administration, criticism mounted from
numerous directions. The journalist Charlie Savage did much to
shine a public spotlight on presidential signing statements, which
he ultimately characterized as a lynchpin of an “imperial presi-
dency” and a critical instrument for the “subversion of American
democracy.”56 For his “revelation[ ]” of the existence of Bush’s con-
troversial signing statements, he was awarded a Pulitzer Prize.57
The American Bar Association (ABA) mobilized a special task force
to examine the Bush Administration’s use of the signing statement,
and the ABA House of Delegates resolved to denounce the Adminis-
tration’s “misuse of presidential signing statements” as contrary to
50. GARVEY, supra note 1, at 7.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Report of the Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of
Powers, 131 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC. 671, 683-84 (2006) [hereinafter ABA Task Force Report].
53. Bradley & Posner, supra note 9, at 321.
54. See id. at 317-20.
55. See, e.g., Kelley & Marshall, supra note 12, at 183-84.
56. SAVAGE, supra note 5, at 228-49.
57. The 2007 Pulitzer Prize Winners: National Reporting, PULITZER PRIZES (2007), http://
archive.pulitzer.org/citation/2007-National-Reporting [https://perma.cc/W33G-QSSG].
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the constitutional separation of powers.58 Congress held hearings to
investigate the President’s use of signing statements.59 Legal aca-
demics and political scientists weighed in on the problems of the
Bush Administration’s signing statements.60
The criticisms of the Bush constitutional signing statements were
various, but three concerns stand out as particularly notable. First,
the signing statements were criticized as subverting interbranch
comity.61 Although signing statements are public and readily avail-
able documents, their relative obscurity suggests to some that there
is something inappropriate about hiding “bold political and legal
actions in plain sight where few of its critics or opponents would see
them.”62 What is worse, signing statements have traditionally been
relatively brief and sweeping, more akin to an exercise in political
rhetoric than legal analysis.63 In the case of the Bush Administra-
tion’s constitutional signing statements, constitutional claims were
“often asserted without supporting authorities, or even serious
efforts at explanation.”64 Rather than engaging Congress in shared
deliberation about constitutional meaning, the White House
deployed a “zero tolerance attitude” toward potential legislative mis-
steps,65 and assigned staff to “scrutinize[ ]” bills “look[ing] for
anything that might infringe on presidential power.”66
58. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 52, at 671, 673.
59. See generally Presidential Signing Statements Under the Bush Administration: A
Threat to Checks and Balances and the Rule of Law?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 110th Cong. (2007); The Use of Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006).
60. See, e.g., JAMES P. PFIFFNER, POWER PLAY, at x-xi (2008); PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S
NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 132-42 (2009); Phillip
J. Cooper, George W. Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the Use and Abuse of Presidential Signing
Statements, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 515, 521, 523-27, 530 (2005); Louis Fisher, Signing
Statements: Constitutional and Practical Limits, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 183, 194, 200-01
(2007); Kelley & Marshall, supra note 11, at 249; May, supra note 21, at 979-80, 986; Neil
Kinkopf, Signing Statements and the President’s Authority to Refuse to Enforce the Law, ACS
ISSUE BRIEF, June 2006, at 2, 5-7.
61. See Cooper, supra note 60, at 518, 521, 525, 531.
62. Id. at 516.
63. See id. at 521.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 526.
66. Kelley & Marshall, supra note 11, at 263.
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Second, the signing statements were denounced as a kind of
absolute, line-item veto.67 When signing statements indicated that
the “executive branch shall construe these sections in a manner
consistent with the constitutional authority of the President,”68 they
asserted an executive power to ignore what Congress had (arguably)
done. Statutory provisions were to be set aside or truncated to the
extent that, in the executive’s own judgment, such provisions im-
pinged on executive authority. In Christopher May’s evocative
characterization, Bush was “Reviving the Royal Prerogative.”69 In
issuing such statements, “Presidents have asserted that they have
the power to disregard any law that they believe to be unconstitu-
tional” and “are in effect asserting an absolute item veto—‘absolute’
because Congress gets no opportunity to override the President’s
action, and an ‘item veto’ because it operates surgically against only
those parts of a statute that the White House finds objectionable.”70
The signing statements were one of the “trappings of an Imperial
Presidency.”71
A corollary to this argument is that Presidents are obliged to ex-
ercise their constitutionally provided veto power when presented
with a bill containing unconstitutional provisions.72 Presidents are
armed with a veto over legislation in part to protect the Constitution
and their own office against legislative encroachment.73 Moreover,
the ability of the President to veto proposed legislation inserts the
President into the legislative process and offers the President the
opportunity to formally weigh in on the desirability of a policy pro-
posal.74 Once a bill becomes law, however, Presidents shift to an
exclusively executive function in which their job is best understood
as requiring them to implement statutes as written rather than
stamp their own policy preferences onto completed legislation.75
67. Cooper, supra note 60, at 518.
68. Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropri-
ations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influence Act, 2006, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1901, 1901 (Dec. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Signing Statement Dec. 30, 2005].
69. May, supra note 21, at 865, 867, 981-82.
70. Id. at 867.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 877-78.
73. See id.
74. See Cooper, supra note 60, at 516-17.
75. See May, supra note 21, at 873-74.
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Moreover, the veto, as outlined in Article I of the Constitution, is
qualified, rather than absolute, and gives Congress a formal oppor-
tunity to consider the President’s objections and respond according-
ly, whether by abandoning the legislation, adjusting it, or mustering
the supermajority necessary to override the veto.76 As the ABA
concluded, the “Constitution thus limits the President’s role in the
lawmaking process.”77 The President has a “constitutional obligation
to veto any bill that he believes violates the Constitution in whole
or in part,” and signing statements are no substitute for fulfilling
that primary constitutional duty.78
Third, the signing statements were criticized for advancing a
flawed theory of a unitary executive. Substantively, many of the
Bush Administration’s signing statements claimed to find flaws
with statutory provisions because they interfered with the ability of
the President to exercise complete and unilateral control over the
executive branch.79 The unitary theory of the executive advanced by
legal conservatives since the Reagan Era argues that, in order for
the President to fulfill his constitutional duty to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed,”80 the President must have the auth-
ority to direct and, if necessary, remove any lower-level executive
official.81 Congressional interference with the President’s command
over executive branch officials would, therefore, be unconstitutional,
impinging on the President’s constitutional authority and inter-
fering with the constitutional scheme by which public policy is
administered.82 Given that focus, the Bush Administration’s signing
statements seemed troubling for simultaneously relying on a con-
troversial understanding of the Constitution and expanding the
power of the office of the President.83
76. See id. at 878.
77. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 52, at 686.
78. Id. at 688; see also CONST. PROJECT, STATEMENT ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATE-
MENTS BY THE COALITION TO DEFEND CHECKS AND BALANCES 1 (2006), http://www.constitution
project.org/pdf/Statement_on_Presidential_Signing_Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8DZ-
MC3W].
79. See Cooper, supra note 60, at 522.
80. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
81. See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 3-4 (2008).
82. See id.
83. See Fisher, supra note 60, at 183.
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The subsequent parts of this Article suggest that these objections
are misplaced. While there might have been reason to object to the
particular content of any given signing statement, the practice of
issuing signing statements is not particularly sinister. Indeed, there
may well be some virtues to Presidents making use of signing state-
ments to voice constitutional objections to provisions of the U.S.
Code.
II. CONFUSING THE MESSAGE WITH THE MESSENGER
Although there have been occasional objections to the President
even issuing signing statements critical of Congress, most of the
contemporary objections to the signing statements issued by the
Bush White House revolved around either the actual substance of
the President’s constitutional claims or the institutional claim that
the President had the authority to “construe these sections in a
manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the Pres-
ident.”84 To the extent that the objection is to the substantive consti-
tutional claim made in the signing statement, then focusing on the
instrument by which the President announced the constitutional
claim is a red herring. Similarly, to the extent that the objection is
to the idea of presidential nonenforcement of arguably constitu-
tional statutory provisions, then it matters little whether the
intention to refuse to enforce such provisions is declared in a signing
statement or elsewhere.
There might be reasons to be skeptical of either the substantive
constitutional claim or the institutional claim made by the Bush
Administration’s signing statements, but none of those reasons cast
doubt on the device of the signing statement itself as a mechanism
for announcing the Administration’s constitutional position.85
Imagine, for example, that the President does not issue a signing
statement at the time that he gives his approval to a bill and
converts it into a law. At some point in the days, weeks, or months
after the law is passed, however, the Administration announces by
some other means its posture on a constitutional question regarding
the statute. Perhaps the White House press secretary takes note of
84. Signing Statement Dec. 30, 2005, supra note 68, at 1901.
85. See Kelley & Marshall, supra note 11, at 250-51.
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the constitutional problem informally in a press conference; perhaps
the attorney general or the Office of Legal Counsel produces an
opinion examining the constitutional question; perhaps the Pres-
ident comments on the constitutional issue in a prepared speech on
some random occasion. Is the Administration’s action properly
subject to any less criticism as a result of announcing its position by
one of those alternative means? It seems unlikely that any critic of
the Bush Administration’s signing statements would be any less
critical if the substantive content of the statement came in some
different form. What generated the criticism was not really the
signing statement as such but the message conveyed therein.
Nonetheless, there might be reasonable concerns about signing
statements as a genre, regardless of the actual content of the state-
ments. The question, however, ought to be a comparative one. If
signing statements are inadequate, then compared to what? Implic-
itly, the ideal seems to be an opinion issued by the U.S. Supreme
Court. It has been common to compare political documents to judi-
cial opinions and find the former wanting.86 Unsurprisingly, signing
statements tend to be conclusory rather than analytical.87 Positions
are stated but are rarely defended—or even fully elaborated and
explained.88 As a vehicle for communicating the Administration’s
constitutional claim, signing statements can be effective, but as a
vehicle for developing and explaining a constitutional argument,
they are inadequate.89 This does not by itself make signing state-
ments problematic, but it does indicate that signing statements
cannot serve the function that we would expect judicial opinions to
serve. They are best viewed as a complement to other documents—
part of a larger effort to advance a presidential understanding of the
Constitution. Signing statements make less sense as stand-alone
documents than as a means of publicizing principles to be developed
in more detail elsewhere.
A second concern with raising constitutional complaints in
signing statements is the potential effect on interbranch relations.
86. See Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections
and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 779 (2002).
87. See Cooper, supra note 60, at 521.
88. See id.
89. See id.
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Expressing constitutional doubts about legislation in a signing
statement might reasonably be taken as disrespectful of the leg-
islature and subversive of a good working relationship between the
two branches.90 At the broadest level, this seems like an exaggerated
concern. In the early days of the republic, the judiciary expressed
some hesitation to openly asserting that Congress had violated the
Constitution.91 Much more preferable, some thought, to maintain
the fiction that Congress would never knowingly cross constitutional
limits.92 But the courts eventually abandoned that polite fiction and
became willing to opine straightforwardly that politicians do not
always attend to the niceties of constitutional fidelity.93 There is
little reason to think that relations between the legislature and the
judiciary are any worse for wear as a consequence of such frank
talk. At this point, Presidents are often biting in references to
Congress in a myriad of venues, from veto messages to stump
speeches.94 Signing statements are neither particularly notable nor
especially cutting in exposing Congress to presidential aspersions.95
Beyond the rhetorical features of constitutional signing state-
ments, there is also a substantive question of the appropriate pos-
ture that Presidents should adopt relative to Congress and proposed
legislation. One of the distinctive features of the Bush signing
statements was the sheer volume of objections that the White House
raised to provisions of federal statutes, and there is reason to think
that the Administration was self-consciously invested in identifying
constitutional problems with the products of the legislative
process.96
Is such aggressive monitoring of legislative action by the exec-
utive constitutionally appropriate? Should the White House give
Congress the benefit of the doubt on disputed constitutional ques-
90. See, e.g., CONST. PROJECT, supra note 78, at 1-2.
91. Mark A. Graber, The New Fiction: Dred Scott and the Language of Judicial Authority,
82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177, 180 (2007).
92. On early judicial rhetoric, see id. at 181; Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Con-
gress Before the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1270-84 (2009).
93. See, e.g., Graber, supra note 91, at 181.
94. See May, supra note 21, at 905, 977.
95. On the ways in which the twentieth-century President abandoned many of the rhetor-
ical constraints that were accepted in the nineteenth-century, see JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE
RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 6-8 (1987).
96. See Kelley & Marshall, supra note 11, at 263.
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tions, rather than combatively casting doubt on Congress? These
questions have two dimensions. At one level, we might be concerned
with how legislators might respond to such a bellicose executive
stance. If legislators are likely to take offense at the White House
questioning the quality of their work and become less cooperative
with the executive as a result, then Presidents might be better
served by adopting a strategy of getting along. Confronting others
on their constitutional deficiencies might ratchet up political conflict
and expend political capital that would be better spent elsewhere.
Presidents must weigh what they hope to accomplish by repeatedly
pointing out constitutional errors against what they hope to
accomplish by choosing to overlook problematic features of leg-
islation of no immediate consequence. The Bush White House might
have imagined that the symbolism of repeatedly insisting on its
constitutional point would chip away at legislative overreach, but
any such gains might be more illusory than real.
At a second level, we might be concerned that such executive
aggressiveness is in conflict with the level of deference that is due
to the national legislature. While the courts might no longer main-
tain the pretense that Congress never passes an unconstitutional
law,97 the judicial branch continues to declare that Congress de-
serves the presumption that its work passes constitutional muster.98
The White House’s willingness to aggressively scrutinize bills for
constitutional flaws would seem to be inconsistent with that more
deferential starting point.99 While the President might not face the
same countermajoritarian difficulty that judges do, the democratic
and deliberative authority of the legislature might well be sufficient
to suggest that the executive should give Congress the benefit of the
doubt on contested constitutional issues.
Beyond the question of signing statements as a genre of presiden-
tial speech is the particular constitutional uses to which they were
97. See, e.g., Graber, supra note 91, at 181, 186 (discussing how pre-Civil War Justices
refrained from declaring federal laws unconstitutional).
98. E.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 738 (2008) (“The usual presumption is that
Members of Congress, in accord with their oath of office, considered the constitutional issue
and determined the amended statute to be a lawful one.”); see also Crabb, supra note 3, at
720.
99. See Kinkopf, supra note 60, at 2-3 (discussing President George W. Bush’s frequent
use of the nonenforcement power).
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put by the Bush Administration. This is not the place to mount an
attack or defense of the substantive theories advanced by the Bush
Administration. It is enough for present purposes to simply
recognize that they are controversial.100 Constitutional controversy
(among faithful interpreters) might take one of two forms. There
might be disagreement about the constitutional rule itself. The
Administration and its opponents might disagree over whether a
proffered legal restraint can even be validly located in the Constitu-
tion. In other cases, there might be disagreement not about the
constitutional rule but about the application of the rule to the issue
at hand.
While both sorts of disagreement create divergence between the
White House and Congress, the first type might be more polarizing.
Disagreements over constitutional applications are routine and are
particularly familiar in the type of hard cases that might be expec-
ted to disproportionately occupy the attention of high-level federal
officials. Disagreements over the existence of a given constitutional
rule, however, are less typical, though hardly unknown within
American politics. Such disagreements might be harder to resolve
since Congress and the President start from such divergent starting
points, which may suggest a more extreme form of constitutional
disagreement. Many of the signing statements issued by the Bush
Administration entered into this sort of controversy, with critics
charging not merely that the Administration misapplied accepted
constitutional doctrine but asserted new, unprecedented, and ill-
conceived doctrines.101 Executive reliance on such constitutional
theories is likely to heighten interbranch and cross-partisan conflict,
and Presidents might need to be particularly wary of taking such a
step.
One difficulty with adopting controversial constitutional rules is
that they might increase the incidences of disagreement. Errors of
constitutional application are likely to be relatively uncommon. If
the constitutional rules are known, failures to abide by them might
come about from a variety of causes, but the objective to be achieved
100. See Cooper, supra note 60, at 516; Kelley & Marshall, supra note 11, at 262-63;
Kinkopf, supra note 60, at 2.
101. See Kinkopf, supra note 60, at 5-6.
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is at least fairly clear.102 When the legislature and the executive are
referencing different constitutional rule books, then constitutional
errors are likely to seem ubiquitous. If the legislature is operating
under a different set of constitutional rules than those that the
executive accepts, then even relatively mundane legislative actions
might seem constitutionally problematic. Moving the constitutional
baseline will suddenly put myriad routine acts on the wrong side of
constitutional requirements. Having adopted a controversial con-
stitutional theory, constitutional actors are likely to find themselves
constantly encountering, identifying, and objecting to constitutional
errors by the legislature.
One somewhat ironic virtue of signing statements, however, is
that they do not do anything. When the judiciary strikes down a law
as unconstitutional, it voids a policy.103 When Presidents veto bills,
they obstruct the creation of new policy.104 When Presidents issue
signing statements voicing constitutional objections to language
within a statute, the arguments advanced have no immediate ef-
fect.105 The signing statement might announce an intention to take
action at some point in the indefinite future, but this challenge to
legislative policy is necessarily smaller than if the statement had
the immediate effect of blocking policy.106 This gap between rhetoric
and reality, or intention and action, provides the executive with
some opportunity to calibrate its actual response to what it under-
stands to be constitutionally problematic legislative provisions.
Signing statements allow for the President to avoid outlining any
plan of action. Or the statement itself might serve as the Admin-
istration’s response to the perceived constitutional violation.107
Statements allow for rhetorical posturing that lays down a marker
on the executive’s favored constitutional interpretation and calls
out the legislature for failing to adequately observe the President’s
view of constitutional boundaries, without requiring the executive
102. On the failures of constitutional constraints, see Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional
Constraints in Politics, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 221, 222
(Steven Kautz et al. eds., 2009).
103. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 180 (1803).
104. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
105. See Cooper, supra note 60, at 516-20 (explaining consequences of signing statements).
106. See id. at 518.
107. See May, supra note 21, at 977.
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to further heighten the conflict by taking action that would actually
affect policy.108 The message is the action.
Simply conveying the message might have particular uses in the
constitutional context. Constitutional law and constitutional norms
develop through accumulated actions. In the judicial arena, these
actions primarily come in the form of decisions that accumulate as
precedents that are eventually taken for granted and become the
foundation for additional decisions further extending and deepening
them.109 In the political arena, precedents are established through
political actions and political rhetoric.110 Acquiescence to political
and policy initiatives lays the foundations for future innovations.
What is controversial now is later taken as a given. Judges them-
selves might well look back on that history in order to identify
whether an adequate pattern of custom and “usage” might have
settled constitutional controversies such that newly raised objec-
tions should be regarded as moot.111
By accepting dubious legislative provisions in silence, Presidents
might well be allowing those constitutional encroachments to be-
come entrenched. Simply voicing objections to them helps provide
the legal materials that future executives might need in order to
pursue more vigorous actions. Rather than being put in the position
of raising seemingly unprecedented constitutional claims, the execu-
tive can point to a history of prior objections that demonstrate that
the executive has never accepted, even if it has gone along with,
legislative assertions.
108. See id. at 937-45.
109. For one elaboration and defense of this vision of constitutional law, see David A.
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 888 (1996).
110. On political development of constitutional expectations and practices, see generally
STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1996); Barry Friedman & Scott B.
Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1998).
111. See generally Ernest A. Young, Our Prescriptive Judicial Power: Constitutive and
Entrenchment Effects of Historical Practice in Federal Courts Law, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.
535, 543 (2016); Keith E. Whittington, Upholding Law in the Nineteenth Century (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with the William & Mary Law Review).
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III. THE VIRTUE OF SIGNING STATEMENTS
Although some characterize presidential signing statements as
exemplifying the executive’s power of unilateral action,112 such
statements should not be categorized as actions at all. At best, sign-
ing statements signal the possibility of future action, but do not
take actions themselves. Unlike a veto or an executive order, sign-
ing statements have no legal force and implement no policy deci-
sion.113 They announce and publicize a position, but cannot execute
a policy.114 The value of the signing statement as a presidential tool
lies in its ability to communicate presidential preferences to others.
Presidents communicate to many audiences, and over time they
have innovated in how to deliver their message to those audiences
more effectively. From written messages to stump speeches, from
inaugural addresses to fireside chats, Presidents have increasingly
leveraged their position to persuade others and mobilize support.115
Signing statements are a particularly flexible tool that can speak to
multiple audiences.116 If this particular instrument is to be elimi-
nated from the President’s toolkit, we should appreciate what func-
tions it has served and what alternatives there might be to replace
them. In this Part, I consider four possible audiences for signing
statements.
Judges are the first potential audience for signing statements.
As the Reagan Administration emphasized, signing statements
build a record of legislative history that might affect how judges
interpret the statutes that the President signs into law.117 Signing
statements provide one contemporaneous claim of how an important
political actor in the legislative process understands the meaning
of the legislation being adopted.118 To the extent that judges regard
such historical materials as relevant to the process of statutory
interpretation, Presidents can seek to build their own record to
112. See, e.g., SAVAGE, supra note 5, at 243.
113. See Kinkopf, supra note 60, at 2, 5.
114. See id.
115. See Kenneth Mayer, Book Review, 5 PERSP. ON POL. 635, 635-36 (2007).
116. Cooper, supra note 60, at 518.
117. See Bradley & Posner, supra note 9, at 316.
118. See Cooper, supra note 60, at 516-17.
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supplement more traditional components of legislative history such
as committee reports.119 There are well known objections to the use
of legislative history in statutory interpretation,120 but to the extent
that such materials are taken to be valuable—and to the extent to
which the President is understood to be part of the relevant legis-
lative process121—then signing statements serve a function compara-
ble to various legislative documents that accompany the production
of statutes.122
Eliminating signing statements would, perhaps inappropriately,
obscure the President’s role in the adoption of legislation and slant
the record of legislative history toward congressionally produced
documents. This would potentially force Presidents to seek out alter-
native mechanisms for putting their stamp on the legislative
history, whether by influencing the drafting of committee reports or
insisting on changes to the statutory text itself.123 Alternatively, if
shut out from contributing to the legislative history, Presidents
might seek to devalue legislative history entirely by, for example,
nominating judges who are committed to textualism in statutory
interpretation.124
Signing statements can also be used to communicate to judges the
administration’s position on constitutional meaning as well as
statutory meaning. Signing statements can outline constitutional
difficulties with statutory provisions, whether or not the statement
goes further and indicates that the administration will avoid imple-
menting the statute in a way that would run afoul of those difficul-
ties.125 Constitutional objections may be raised in either a weak
form—merely flagging possible constitutional concerns—or a strong
119. See id. at 517.
120. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative
History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 161-62
(2008).
121. See SAVAGE, supra note 5, at 234 (noting that judges did not support an initial attempt
to have presidential signing statements constitute legislative history).
122. Steven G. Calabresi & Daniel Lev, The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing
Statements, FORUM, Sep. 2006, at 1, 5.
123. See Cross, supra note 48, at 222, 224.
124. See Cooper, supra note 60, at 517; see also Waites, supra note 49, at 775 (explaining
the President’s influence on the composition of the judiciary).
125. See Cooper, supra note 60, at 516-17.
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form—asserting that the statute contradicts constitutional require-
ments.126 
The executive branch has an obvious alternative means for com-
municating its constitutional concerns to the judiciary in the context
of litigation. Whether through amicus briefs or directly as a party
in a case, administration lawyers are likely to have opportunities to
advance their constitutional arguments before the bench.127 The
distinctive utility of signing statements is reduced to the extent that
such direct communication to judges is adequate to elaborate the
administration’s positions.128 Indeed, the detailed argument con-
tained in legal briefs is likely to be of higher quality than the short
assertions that might be contained in signing statements.129
If legal briefs are preferable as a means for advancing high-qual-
ity legal arguments directly to judges, the advantage of the supple-
mental mechanism may be primarily a matter of timing.130 Signing
statements issue contemporaneously with the adoption of a statute
but prior to enforcement,131 whereas legal briefs accompany litiga-
tion,132 which in turn must generally wait until implementation of
the terms of the statute has begun. The administration may find
publicizing its constitutional arguments early advantageous to the
degree that such arguments may impact parties and lawyers
considering litigation. Presidents might be able to interject their
perspective into legal arguments before the government would
otherwise be able to make an appearance in a court. Signing
126. See May, supra note 21, at 933 tbl.3 (noting the various constitutional grounds on
which Presidents objected to statutes).
127. May, supra note 21, at 940-43 (discussing examples of the executive branch asserting
that a law was unconstitutional when the government was a party to the suit); Anne
Skrodzki, Comment, Signing Statements and the New Supreme Court: The Future of Pres-
idential Expression, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1317, 1329, 1335 (2007) (discussing examples of
the executive branch using amicus briefs to assert that a law was unconstitutional).
128. Cross, supra note 48, at 234.
129. Cf. Cooper, supra note 60, at 521 (discussing the lack of legal analysis in many signing
statements voicing constitutional objections); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The
Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 817 (2000)
(explaining the quality of amicus briefs and their impact on judicial decisions).
130. Cross, supra note 48, at 232.
131. See Calabresi & Lev, supra note 122, at 1 n.2; May, supra note 21, at 905.
132. See FED. R. APP. P. 29(e) (requiring the filing of an amicus brief within seven days of
the filing of the principle briefs); id. 31(a) (requiring the filing of an appellant’s brief within
forty days of the record filing and appellee’s brief thirty days thereafter).
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statements also give the President an opportunity to put his
constitutional concerns on the public record, even if no litigation on
those issues arises during the President’s term of office.133 While
such unique benefits to the administration of being able to make use
of a signing statement are real, they are likely to be relatively small
given the ready access that the White House has to the courts and
the ability to make its case more directly to a judicial audience.134
Congress is a second possible audience for presidential signing
statements. To legislators, the presidential signing statement serves
as a warning about possible implementation of the newly adopted
statute.135 The effect, of course, is to throw down a gauntlet in a pub-
lic confrontation between the White House and Congress.136 While
the signing statement makes the administration’s intentions more
visible to Congress, it encourages further legislative surveillance
and investigation of how the executive branch is implementing stat-
utes.137
But again, we should consider what alternatives would be avail-
able to the administration if signing statements were taken out of
the toolkit. Perhaps the most likely alternative is simply for the
executive branch to behave the same as it otherwise would have, but
to do so without the visibility associated with the public statement
of the administration’s intentions. While presidential signing state-
ments sometimes reference politically salient and fairly visible
executive actions that would be at issue under the statute,138 they
often relate to more low-profile issues that may otherwise fly under
the radar.139 Executive implementation of the statutory provisions
at issue would, absent the signing statement, be far less visible to
legislators.140 The statement makes visible a conflict between the
133. See Cooper, supra note 60, at 519.
134. See, e.g., May, supra note 21, at 940-43 (providing examples of Presidents challenging
a law’s constitutionality as a party to the case); Skrodzki, supra note 127, at 1335 (providing
examples of the executive branch using amicus briefs to challenge a law’s constitutionality).
135. See Cooper, supra note 60, at 520 (explaining that a signing statement can give details
about the executive’s directives for implementation).
136. See, e.g., id. at 522, 524.
137. See id. at 520.
138. See, e.g., Signing Statement Nov. 17, 1971, supra note 16, at 360 (noting that statutory
provisions urging a “final date” would not change the administration’s Vietnam policy).
139. See, e.g., Popkin, supra note 44, at 702-03, app. at 718-22.
140. See Cooper, supra note 60, at 520.
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executive and the legislature that would otherwise still exist but
would be less clear to the legislature.141 Discouraging signing state-
ments would just push the conflict into the shadows.
An administration focused on the production of signing state-
ments, however, might be dedicating resources at the wrong point
in the policy-making process. Signing statements are generated at
the end of the legislative process, as bills reach the White House for
the President’s signature.142 At least in the Bush Administration,
bills adopted by Congress were routed through a group of lawyers
who reviewed them for objectionable provisions and drafted signing
statements to flag those provisions.143 Although critics have com-
plained about this systematic effort of “picking through bills of Con-
gress to find things to disagree with,”144 a more potent objection
might be to the tardiness of the intervention. If officials within the
administration are likely to have objections to legislative proposals,
the more productive time to intervene is during the legislative pro-
cess rather than at its end.145 White House efforts to lobby the
legislature to modify bills might not always be effective, but
bargaining at the drafting stage is likely to be more effective in
shaping policy than writing signing statements in the transition
between the legislation and the implemention stages of the policy-
making process. Signing statements might still usefully memorial-
ize objections that had been made in vain during the lawmaking
process, but holding objections until the signing stage has limited
value.
Optimally, signing statements would be a last-ditch effort to voice
administration concerns about a bill after all lobbying efforts have
failed, rather than a first option.146 Even so, raising constitutional
concerns for the first time in a signing statement seems preferable
to burying constitutional concerns that had been raised during the
lawmaking process but put on the shelf once Congress adopted the
141. See id. at 522, 524.
142. See May, supra note 21, at 905.
143. SAVAGE, supra note 5, at 236.
144. Id. at 237 (quoting Ron Klain, former Chief of Staff to Vice President Al Gore).
145. See Cross, supra note 48, at 214-17.
146. See id. at 224 (describing the usefulness as well as drawbacks in having the executive
voice administrative concerns in signing statements); see also Kinkopf, supra note 60, at 6-7
(concluding that more modern signing statements have proven particularly problematic).
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flawed measure. The Clinton Administration, for example, repeat-
edly denounced as unconstitutional the key provisions of the Com-
munications Decency Act (CDA), which criminalized the transmis-
sion via the Internet of “patently offensive” material to minors.147
Nonetheless, when the CDA was incorporated into the broader
Telecommunications Act of 1996,148 President Clinton organized a
celebratory signing ceremony at the Library of Congress and issued
two separate signing statements praising the “historic legisla-
tion.”149 The President chose to make no mention of the Communica-
tions Decency Act or its constitutional flaws in those signing
statements, though he did single out a different provision of the bill
that extended a ban on the “transmittal of abortion-related speech
and information” as unconstitutional.150 The Department of Justice,
he affirmed, would treat that provision of the newly enacted statute
as void, and thus it would “not be enforced.”151
Ultimately, proactively lobbying the legislature so as to identify
and try to defeat constitutionally dubious legislative proposals
would be the preferable approach for dealing with legislators who
advance policies that the administration regards as constitutionally
problematic. Once such efforts have failed, however, issuing a sign-
ing statement calling attention to the constitutional problem would
seem preferable to letting the flawed statute pass in silence.
The Bush Administration’s approach of going through statutes
with a fine-tooth comb after the bills have already passed through
Congress may also have the tendency of instigating unnecessary
conflicts.152 Political scientists have distinguished between “fire
alarm” and “police patrol” models of oversight.153 Police patrols are
“comparatively centralized, active, and direct.”154 In this case, by
147. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 56, 134
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2012)); Whittington, supra note 102, at 208-10.
148. Whittington, supra note 102, at 208.
149. Statement on Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 188 (Feb.
8, 1996) [hereinafter Clinton Telecommunications Signing Statement I]; Remarks on Signing
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 185, 186 (Feb. 8, 1996).
150. See Clinton Telecommunications Signing Statement I, supra note 149.
151. Id.
152. See SAVAGE, supra note 5, at 236.
153. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
154. Id.
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directing White House attorneys to review every bill to identify con-
stitutional flaws, the Bush Administration adopted a police patrol
model for addressing legislative errors.155 In contrast, a fire alarm
model would take a more passive approach, waiting for constitu-
tional problems to arise in the course of policy administration and
trying to resolve them only at that point.156
In general, the fire alarm model has an advantage over the police
patrol model in its ability to focus resources on policy decisions that
prove to be actually controversial in practice while avoiding policies
that might appear problematic in the abstract but provoke no
controversies in practice.157 Signing statements have the disadvan-
tage of trying to evaluate the consequences of statutory provisions
in the abstract with no real information about what concrete prob-
lems actual implementation of the statute might reveal. In general,
this form of oversight might simply be regarded as wasteful, forcing
government officials to spend time on hypothetical problems rather
than real problems.158
In this particular context, however, we might think that such ad-
ministration efforts are not merely inefficient. Signing statements
might be prone to errors, in the sense of generating false negatives
(by missing constitutional flaws that will only become apparent in
the midst of implementation) and false positives (by flagging consti-
tutional flaws that would otherwise never present actual problems).
Statutory provisions that might have proven relatively harmless
wind up getting elevated into points of conflict between the
executive and the legislature by this proactive approach. Faced with
the choice, the lawyers of the Office of Legal Counsel might be
better used for writing opinions to provide guidance when constitu-
tional questions arise in the context of statutory implementation
than for writing signing statements at the time of statutory passage.
Lower-level executive officials constitute a third possible audience
for presidential signing statements. Controlling the executive bu-
155. Cf. id.
156. See id. American-style judicial review also operates on the fire alarm model. See, e.g.,
David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723, 747-54
(2009); Keith E. Whittington, Legislative Sanctions and the Strategic Environment of Judicial
Review, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 446, 457 & n.30 (2003).
157. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 153, at 168.
158. See id.
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reaucracy is a basic challenge of presidential leadership, particu-
larly in the context of the modern state where the executive
bureaucracy is vast and most executive agents are insulated from
presidential appointment and removal by the civil service system.159
Presidents face incentives to try to “politicize” the executive appara-
tus and “centralize” decision-making in the White House in order to
exert as much control as possible over executive policy making.160
Rather than relying on distant bureaucrats, Presidents would prefer
to have important policy decisions made by political appointees who
are more likely to share presidential preferences and are more
readily held accountable for their actions.161 The sheer size of the
modern executive bureaucracy and the complexity of modern policy
making create governing dilemmas for the President.162
The White House has difficulty monitoring what is happening
across the vast executive branch, and even politically sympathetic
government officials located far from the Oval Office may have diffi-
culty identifying what presidential preferences might be regarding
the daily mundane tasks of normal governance. Signing statements
can be a helpful tool for coordinating action across that executive
bureaucracy. Lawyers relatively close to the President can be tasked
with the responsibility of identifying constitutional issues that
might otherwise go unnoticed by lower-level government officials
housed in the bowels of the Department of Education, for example,
and for formulating a coordinated administration response to those
issues that the lower-level officials would be expected to carry out.163
Absent the mechanism of the signing statement, Presidents would
need to search for some alternative tool for ensuring that their
wishes are recognized and acted upon by far-flung administrators.
159. See George A. Krause et al., Political Appointments, Civil Service Systems, and Bu-
reaucratic Competence: Organizational Balancing and Executive Branch Revenue Forecasts
in the American States, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 770, 770-71 (2006).
160. See generally Daniel Galvin & Colleen Shogan, Presidential Politicization and Central-
ization Across the Modern-Traditional Divide, 36 POLITY 477 (2004); Terry M. Moe, The
Politicized Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 235 (John E. Chubb &
Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985).
161. See Galvin & Shogan, supra note 160, at 481, 488, 494.
162. See id. at 481; Moe, supra note 160, at 249-50 (detailing the growth of executive
agencies).
163. See Cooper, supra note 60, at 516-17, 519-20 (explaining that some signing statements
include directions for officials in executive agencies).
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Signing statements might substitute for—or supplement—other
White House efforts to supervise distant executive-branch employ-
ees. To the extent that we think it would be preferable for executive
officers to be responsive to presidential directives, then hampering
the ability of presidents to coordinate the actions of those officers
through signing statements would seem counterproductive.
Finally, the general public is a fourth possible audience for sign-
ing statements. Signing statements are distinctly public documents,
if not necessarily widely read or high-profile.164 They are written
precisely to publicize presidential positions, at least to the inter-
ested public if not to the mass public.165 Oftentimes, they are mere
puffery. They try to call the public’s attention to legislative accom-
plishments for which the President can claim some credit.166 But no
matter how substantively thick or thin a signing statement might
be, it is designed for public consumption.
A singular virtue of signing statements is their introduction of
transparency into American governance. As noted previously, sign-
ing statements are not themselves unilateral presidential action,
but they can publicize unilateral presidential action.167 While some
executive actions are highly visible, from vetoing legislation to
launching missiles, many are not.168 In the extreme case—for exam-
ple, covert government action in the context of the war on terror—
executive actions are intended to be largely invisible. When Con-
gress incorporated the Detainee Treatment Act into an emergency
supplemental appropriations bill, however, the Bush Administration
issued a signing statement observing that the requirement that de-
tainees not be subjected to what had euphemistically become known
as “enhanced” interrogation techniques would be construed “in a
manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President
to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in
Chief.”169 While the statement itself does little to specify what ac-
tions the executive might take, it does acknowledge the potential
164. See Kinkopf, supra note 60, at 2.
165. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 60, at 519.
166. See May, supra note 21, at 930 & n.304 (explaining the President’s use of signing
statements as a way to give credit, especially during an election year).
167. E.g., Kinkopf, supra note 60, at 2, 5.
168. See Cooper, supra note 60, at 520.
169. Signing Statement Dec. 30, 2005, supra note 68, at 1902.
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conflict between the Administration’s internal plans and the policy
advanced by Congress, and puts Congress on notice that the conflict
has not yet been resolved. Presidential positions that might other-
wise have appeared only in unpublished OLC opinions at least see
the light of day if articulated in signing statments.
IV. THE DECLINE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL VETO
Utilizing the presidential veto power has been offered as the chief
alternative to issuing signing statements raising constitutional
doubts about provisions of an enacted statute.170 Unlike signing
statements, presidential vetoes and veto messages are explicitly
provided for in the U.S. Constitution.171 While signing statements
provide no formal opportunity for Congress to respond to presiden-
tial concerns, the Constitution mandates that Congress has the
opportunity to override the veto of a bill.172 The President’s veto
power is qualified, not absolute, and a sufficiently large majority of
legislators can reverse the President’s judgment that a bill is consti-
tutionally problematic.173 Presidential objections to a bill are offered
for congressional consideration in a veto message, rather than
imperiously handed down in a signing statement.
It is worth noting that the modern preference for vetoes over
signing statements departs from historical traditions. The Whigs
who first objected to the use of signing statements were equally
displeased with the presidential use of the veto power.174 The Whig
theory of the presidency held that both were inconsistent with the
proper balancing of the legislature and executive.175 When President
John Tyler issued a signing statement raising constitutional qualms
about a newly passed apportionment act, then-Representative and
former-President John Quincy Adams wrote a committee report
objecting to the innovation.176 Adams complained that the Presi-
170. See May, supra note 21, at 877-78.
171. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
172. Id.
173. Id.; May, supra note 21, at 878.
174. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Construction and Departmentalism: A Case
Study of the Demise of the Whig Presidency, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 425, 438-39 (2010).
175. See id.
176. See H.R. REP. NO. 27-909, at 1-2 (1842).
2017] MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING 1781
dent’s only constitutional choices were to approve or veto legislation,
but issuing a statement “means not approval, but doubt.”177 The
President was casting aspersions on the wisdom of Congress and the
validity of the statute, when the President’s only duty was to show
“mere obsequiousness to the will of Congress.”178 By effectively sup-
plementing the text of the statute with the signing statement, the
President “would transfer the legislative power of Congress itself to
the arbitrary will of the Executive.”179 Adams was no happier when
Tyler vetoed legislation. Adams fondly recalled a time when merely
taking notice of the wishes of the President on legislation “was
regarded as an outrage upon the rights of the deliberative body,
among the first of whose duties it is to spurn the influence of the
dispenser of patronage and power.”180 The willingness of the
President to elevate himself to a position of equivalence with Con-
gress resulted in “the whole legislative power of the Union” being
“strangled” and placed “in a state of suspended animation” by the
arrogant “will of one man” wielding the veto pen.181
Adams would have preferred to have amended the veto power
contained in the Constitution.182 Not all the Whigs would have gone
that far, but they shared Adams’s general concern.183 Concerns of
that sort drove William Henry Harrison to announce in his inaugu-
ral address that he would seek to “arrest the progress of that
tendency” observed in Democratic Administrations toward creating
a “virtual monarchy.”184 A key part of that effort was his pledge to
refrain from using the veto power in any but the most exceptional
of circumstances.185 On disputed questions of policy or principle, the
177. Id. at 7.
178. Id. at 7
179. Id. at 5.
180. H.R. REP. NO. 27-998, at 29 (1842).
181. Id. at 35.
182. See id. at 35-36 (“[T]he abusive exercise of the constitutional power of the President
to arrest the action of Congress ... has wrought conviction upon the minds of a majority of the
committee, that the veto power itself must be restrained and modified by an amendment of
the Constitution.”).
183. See Gerhardt, supra note 174, at 443-45.
184. President William Henry Harrison, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1841), http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25813 [https://perma.cc/HG5R-8ZJF].
185. See id. (“I consider the veto power, therefore, given by the Constitution to the Execu-
tive of the United States solely as a conservative power, to be used only first, to protect the
Constitution from violation; secondly, the people from the effects of hasty legislation where
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executive would defer to the elected representatives of the people
assembled in Congress.186 From that Whiggish perspective, the criti-
cal flaw in President Tyler’s signing statements and his vetoes was
his willingness to set himself against Congress.
Few today would embrace the Whig’s theory of the presidency and
a generalized posture of presidential deference to Congress. Modern
commentators generally prefer a more activist presidency that is
capable of advancing policies independently of Congress.187 To that
extent, we tend to be more Jacksonian than Whiggish in our under-
standing of the presidential role within the American constitutional
system.188 But that sentiment would seem to imply that Presidents
have a responsibility to use both vetoes and signing statements to
advance their policy views and constitutional understandings. We
would not expect the President to sit idly by while Congress passes
legislation that the President thinks violates the Constitution.189 We
expect the President to take action to stop the constitutional viola-
tion. It seems unlikely that the veto is the exclusive tool available
to Presidents for that purpose.
If we think Presidents should act independently of Congress to
prevent constitutional violations, then it seems reasonable to expect
Presidents to favor the aggressive use of the veto power. But there
are reasons to doubt whether the veto power is adequate for this
purpose in the modern legislative context. Vetoing legislation is a
relatively drastic response to flawed legislation. The veto threat
puts the President in a powerful bargaining position to try to move
legislative details toward his favored position,190 but the President
ultimately faces an all-or-nothing choice. When considering whether
their will has been probably disregarded or not well understood, and, thirdly, to prevent the
effects of combinations violative of the rights of minorities.”).
186. See id. (“I may observe that I consider it the right and privilege of the people to decide
disputed points of the Constitution arising from the general grant of power to Congress to
carry into effect the powers expressly given; and I believe ... such disputed points as settled.”).
187. See, e.g., J. Richard Broughton, Rethinking the Presidential Veto, 42 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 91, 111 (2005); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power
to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 549 (1994); Alberto R. Gonzales, Advising the
President: The Growing Scope of Executive Power to Protect America, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 451, 457 (2015).
188. See Broughton, supra note 187, at 91-93.
189. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (stating that the President shall “preserve, protect,
and defend the Constitution”).
190. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2127-28 (1989).
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to veto a bill, the White House must decide whether it prefers a less-
than-ideal new law or the status quo. How heavily should constitu-
tional flaws weigh in that calculation?
Suppose that the President thinks a piece of legislation is general-
ly valuable but contains some relatively minor constitutional flaws.
What course of action is most appropriate in such a situation?
Preferably, the White House would point out the flaws to Congress
and seek to have the bill modified to remove them. That effort might
fail for a myriad of reasons, however, ranging from disagreements
about the constitutional issue itself to disagreements about the bill’s
importance. The White House must then decide whether the consti-
tutional flaw is sufficiently grave to justify losing the otherwise
valuable policy in its entirety.
We are accustomed to being constitutional perfectionists. We gen-
erally assume that constitutional violations should always be
identified and corrected. But that orientation is easier to sustain in
the judicial context, where judges can zero in on the specific appli-
cation that produces the constitutional violation. The presidential
veto is a relatively blunt instrument, and as a consequence the cost-
benefit ratio of eliminating constitutional imperfections from the
law is less favorable than abandoning a policy.
Consider, for example, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act
of 2009.191 President Barack Obama signed the measure into law
and issued a statement praising the ways in which the law would
empower the Department of Justice “to address the challenges that
face the Nation in difficult economic times and to do their part to
help the Nation respond to this challenge.”192 But the President also
singled out the law’s requirement that executive officials “furnish to
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, a legislative entity, any
information related to any Commission inquiry,” and noted that “as
[his] Administration communicated to the Congress during the
legislative process, the executive branch [would] construe this sub-
section of the bill not to abrogate any constitutional privilege.”193
191. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.).
192. Statement on Signing the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 689, 689 (May 20, 2009) [herinafter Obama Signing Statement May 20, 2009].
193. Id.
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Presumably, the constitutional violation represented by the objec-
tionable reporting requirement is relatively minor (and perhaps
mostly hypothetical) compared to the expected social benefits that
would be produced by the new law. Even from the Administration’s
perspective—which implicitly accepted that the constitutional
violation appeared likely and real—the constitutional damage might
be worth absorbing in order to gain the benefits of the law.194 A veto
under such circumstances would be inadvisable, while a signing
statement would offer a less costly opportunity for addressing the
potential constitutional problem.
The cost-benefit calculation of using the veto to address constitu-
tional difficulties in statutes has become even more daunting in the
modern context. As the example of the Fraud Enforcement and
Recovery Act indicates, the constitutional difficulty with a piece of
legislation may only involve a small subsection of a much larger
measure.195 Classical exemplars of constitutionally motivated vetoes
tend to put the constitutional dispute at the center of the legislative
struggle. When George Washington was urged to veto, and Andrew
Jackson actually did veto, the charter for the Bank of the United
States, the very legitimacy of a national bank was at issue.196 The
constitutional objection went to the core of the proposed bill, not to
a peripheral feature of it.197 But distinguishing what is central and
what is peripheral to a bill is itself endogenous to the legislative
process.
When President Cleveland vetoed a record-breaking 304 bills dur-
ing his first term,198 he was working with a Congress that produced
hundreds of individual bills that averaged just over a page in
length. Most of them were private bills affecting single individuals199
or highly specific public works bills, such as his first veto of a bill
194. See Cooper, supra note 60, at 518.
195. See Obama Signing Statement May 20, 2009, supra note 192.
196. See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), reprinted in 3 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1139, 1139 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897);
see also Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional
Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1644-45 (2008).
197. See Jackson, supra note 196, at 1139.
198. See Broughton, supra note 187, at 124-25.
199. See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the
Second Half-Century, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 667, 797 (2003).
2017] MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING 1785
authorizing the construction of a bridge in Vermont.200 The con-
sequences of vetoing such a bill were relatively small.
The modern Congress does not operate in the same way. Omnibus
legislation is common. Whereas the 50th Congress presented Cleve-
land with hundreds of bills authorizing individual construction pro-
jects in 1887, the 114th Congress presented President Obama with
a single transportation bill in 2015 that used over a thousand pages
of text to allocate hundreds of billions of dollars.201 When the 112th
Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012, it
occupied hundreds of pages and sprawled across dozens of titles.202
Unsurprisingly, upon signing the bill, the President issued a
statement observing that the bill “provides the funding necessary
for the smooth operation of our Nation’s Government,” but also
identifying numerous provisions that “raise constitutional con-
cerns.”203 The stakes of vetoing such a bill are much higher, and
Congress in effect has chosen to raise the stakes by bundling what
were once discrete pieces of legislation into such large packages. In
such circumstances, the veto power becomes much less useful as a
practical tool for preventing constitutional violations by Congress.
Signing statements become about the best option a hapless Presi-
dent has to record constitutional objections to what Congress has
done.
When the veto is an empty threat, are Presidents powerless in the
face of (arguably) unconstitutional legislative provisions? John
Marshall’s argument on behalf of a judicial duty to interpret the
Constitution and hold the “fundamental” law more dear than mere
statutes204 has implications for the President. Marshall observed
that acts prohibited by the Constitution and acts allowed under it
could not be “of equal obligation.”205 If a statute contrary to the
Constitution was void and of no authority, how could the President
200. See Grover Cleveland, Veto Message (July 30, 1886), reprinted in 11 A COMPILATION
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 196, at 5060.
201. Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1312
(2015).
202. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786 (2011).
203. Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1568,
1568 (Dec. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Obama Signing Statement Dec. 23, 2011].
204. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
205. Id. at 176-77.
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be obliged “to give it effect”?206 The executive, no more than the
judiciary, can hardly “close [its] eyes on the constitution, and see
only the law.”207 The executive function of enforcing the law is not
wholly distinct from the judicial function of interpreting the law.
Unsurprisingly, political and legal theorists prior to Montesquieu
tended to merge the two.208 Like the judiciary, the executive applies
the law to the particular case, and consequently must make at least
an initial determination as to what the law is that is applicable in
a given situation.209 The judiciary and the executive share the duty
to correctly execute the applicable law, and the Constitution is part
of the law to be correctly applied.210 To the extent that this observa-
tion is true, signing statements merely make plain what is other-
wise implicit in the President’s duty as the chief executive under the
Constitution.
When the conflict between a statutory provision and the Constitu-
tion is clear on the face of the statute, the pressure to veto the
legislation is particularly intense. The adoption of such a statute
will make constitutional violations inevitable. Refraining from veto-
ing the bill simply passes the responsibility to remedy the constitu-
tional violation to the courts. But this challenge describes only a
fraction of the conflicts between federal statutes and the Constitu-
tion that even the Supreme Court is called upon to address. The
Court is not often called upon to declare whether the bare terms of
legislation violate constitutional requirements. When exercising the
power of judicial review, the Court is often called on to determine
not whether the statute on its face violates the Constitution, but
whether the statute as applied violates the Constitution.211 The
206. Id. at 177.
207. Id. at 178.
208. See Keith E. Whittington, The Separation of Powers at the Founding, in THE SEPARA-
TION OF POWERS 1, 2-3 (Katy J. Harriger ed., 2003).
209. The difficult issue for both the courts and the President is what to do about
disagreements over what the Constitution requires.
210. For an elaboration of this idea of “judicial duty” as an aspect of what it means to apply
the law in a complex constitutional system, as opposed to conceptualizing judicial review as
a distinctive “power” of the courts to check legislative abuses, see PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW
AND JUDICIAL DUTY 17-18 (2008).
211. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIW OF ACTS OF CONGRESS
FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE PRESENT (forthcoming) (manuscript at 12-13) (on file with the
William & Mary Law Review).
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constitutional difficulty resides in the potential implications of the
statute, not on its surface. Allowing the statute to be put on the
books would not itself create the constitutional problem. Vetoing
such a bill would negate the policy for the sake of preventing
constitutional violations that might not even arise. Constitutionally
sensitive administration of the law holds the possibility of avoiding
the violation in the first place.212
Many signing statements put this interpretive aspect of the
executive office front and center. In order to “faithfully execute[ ]”
the law,213 the President must determine what the applicable law
is.214 As Marshall would have emphasized, this inquiry sometimes
requires disentangling and prioritizing multiple legal directives,
including those arising from the fundamental law.215 For example,
section 8013 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012,
incorporated in the Defense Appropriation Act of 2012, prohibits the
use of the appropriated funds “in any way, directly or indirectly, to
influence congressional action on any legislation or appropriation
matters pending before the Congress.”216 The statute prohibits
government employees from trying to influence Congress and
borrows language from the long-standing Anti-Lobbying Act that
has been regularly incorporated into various appropriations bills.217
Various entities, including the Department of Justice, have in turn
sought to construe such provisions in a manner that rules out some
forms of lobbying that Congress might find objectionable while still
permitting other activities, such as giving public speeches on policy
issues or otherwise conveying the Administration’s positions on
212. See generally Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006) (discussing the Executive’s use of the avoidance cannon of
statutory interpretation).
213. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
214. Cf. Prakash, supra note 196, at 1645 (“The Constitution never says that the President
is generally barred from interpreting the Constitution and acting on his interpretations.”).
215. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (“[I]f both the law and the
constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case
conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution,
disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the
case.”).
216. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 8013, 125 Stat. 786, 807
(2011); see Crabb, supra note 3, at 722-23 (discussing the basis for executive constitutional
interpretation).
217. See STEPHEN K. SCROGGS, ARMY RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS 3-4 (2000).
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proposed legislation, that indirectly influence the legislative activity
of Congress.218 President Obama’s signing statement calling out this
provision did not significantly alter this legal framework, but simply
called attention to it by noting “I have advised Congress that I will
not construe these provisions as preventing me from fulfilling my
constitutional responsibility to recommend to the Congress’s consid-
eration such measures as I shall judge necessary and expedient.”219
Such executive efforts to articulate what Congress meant when
adopting a given statutory provision—what the statute’s legal effect
should be understood to be—are unavoidable. Taking the Constitu-
tion into account when engaging in those efforts of statutory
interpretation would seem to be generally desirable.
Signing statements shed light on that process but do not sig-
nificantly alter it. When President Benjamin Harrison signed the
Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890,220 he did not issue a signing state-
ment. Substantial disagreement existed in Congress over the scope
of congressional authority to regulate monopolies. While Senator
John Sherman took a broad view of federal authority, others took a
more restrictive view and successfully amended the statute to delete
references to unlawful restraints on “production” in favor of
regulating restraints on “trade and commerce.”221 The Harrison
Administration did not aggressively bring prosecutions under the
Act, and the Administration of his successor Grover Cleveland was
not much different.222 Attorney General Richard Olney of the Cleve-
land Administration was a skeptic of the statute,223 and was not
surprised when the U.S. Supreme Court restricted the statute in a
test case to exclude monopolistic behavior that affects interstate
commerce “only incidentally and indirectly.”224 The executive branch
had no choice but to make decisions about what activities fell with-
in the scope of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and thus what cases to
218. See id. at 4-6.
219. Obama Signing Statement Dec. 23, 2011, supra note 203, at 1569.
220. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209.
221. Keith E. Whittington, Congress Before the Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. REV. 821, 842
(2005).
222. See id. at 843-44.
223. See id.
224. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895); Whittington, supra note 221,
at 843.
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prosecute. Making those determinations, however, required inter-
preting what was meant by the prohibition on contracts made “in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.”225 For the
Cleveland Administration, that provision meant contracts that di-
rectly restrained interstate commerce,226 and the Court ultimately
agreed.227 Reaching that conclusion effectively narrowed the scope
of the statute by ruling out possible applications of the law that
exceeded the scope of congressional authority, but it left in place a
variety of possible applications of the law where prosecutions could
be made and sustained by the courts. Those interpretive decisions
would have been made regardless of whether President Harrison
issued a statement pointing out the difficulty at the time of the law’s
passage. Such a signing statement would have made more visible
the workings of the executive branch, but the executive responsibil-
ity would have been the same regardless of the issuance of any
public statement highlighting the issue.
Signing statements have been criticized as the functional equiv-
alent of an absolute line-item veto,228 but the Sherman Antitrust Act
example illustrates how signing statements are less absolute and
final than a veto message. If Harrison had chosen to veto the
Sherman Antitrust Act on the grounds that Congress was unconsti-
tutionally attempting, in part, to regulate manufacturing, it would
have removed the possibility of any antitrust prosecutions by the
federal government until Congress took new action at some point in
the future. By allowing the law to take effect, however, the Adminis-
tration at least laid the groundwork for bringing prosecutions of
some restraints on trade, even if it viewed its hands as being tied in
cases against monopolies in manufacturing, such as the sugar
trust.229
225. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1).
226. See Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Laurence D. Nee, The Unitary Execu-
tive During the Third Half-Century, 1889-1945, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2004).
227. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 581-82 (1895).
228. See, e.g., ABA Task Force Report, supra note 52, at 688; Garber & Wimmer, supra note
49, at 376.
229. See ALBERT H. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 77-81 (1910).
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When Cleveland took office in 1893, his Administration needed to
make a fresh judgment on the legal scope of the antitrust statute.
As it happened, the Cleveland Administration shared the Harrison
Administration’s restrictive view of the interstate Commerce
Clause, and thus of the Sherman Antitrust Act.230 But Harrison’s
successor was free to decide otherwise. If John Sherman had been
elected President in 1892, for example, then his Administration
presumably would have embraced the broad view of congressional
authority that he had advocated while serving in Congress and thus
would have concluded that cases like United States v. E.C. Knight
were well within the scope of the terms of the interstate Commerce
Clause and the Sherman Antitrust Act. Harrison’s decision to sign
the Act while adopting a narrow interpretation of its effects set the
stage for a subsequent President to act more aggressively. If
Harrison had memorialized his narrow reading of the statute in a
signing statement, he still would not have been able to tie the hands
of a future President who might disagree with that reading. Har-
rison could only make public his own Administration’s views about
the meaning of the statute; he could not alter the terms of the
statute. Signing statements are by their nature ephemeral. A
President who hopes to bind his successors should veto legislation.
With a signing statement, he can only hope to persuade future Pres-
idents to see things in the same way as his own Administration did.
CONCLUSION
Congress sometimes makes mistakes. When a federal statute
appears to include provisions that violate the dictates of the U.S.
Constitution, Presidents are faced with a dilemma. If they veto a
proposed bill containing such provisions, they risk losing valu-
able—and sometimes essential—public policy. If they sign such a
bill, they are potentially tasked with the responsibility of adminis-
tering a constitutionally problematic statute.
Signing statements offer a middle ground between a veto and
simple acquiescence. They have become useful vehicles for articulat-
ing constitutional concerns about legislation, whether those con-
230. See Whittington, supra note 221, at 843-44.
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cerns point the way toward future litigation, nonenforcement, or
careful administration. Although often characterized as a form of
unilateral action on the part of the President, signing statements
are better understood as tools for giving greater visibility to the
process of administering the law. The statements themselves have
no consequence, but they shine a spotlight on considerations that
might otherwise remain hidden within the dark corners of the
executive branch. By giving voice to constitutional concerns about
newly adopted statutes, the administration efficiently communi-
cates to a variety of audiences while memorializing for the future
constitutional objections that might otherwise have been left hidden
in private conversations.
Critics of recent signing statements would be better served by
focusing their critiques at the substantive constitutional disagree-
ments that they might have with executive officials, rather than the
medium by which those officials voice their positions. Signing state-
ments are, to be sure, crude instruments. They announce positions.
They do not advance arguments and give evidence. By highlighting
disagreements, they risk escalating interbranch conflicts. But they
also give public evidence of ongoing presidential engagement with
the Constitution. Presidents might well be misguided in the posi-
tions that they assume, but neither Congress nor the general public
are likely to be well served by encouraging Presidents to obscure
those positions rather than make them more transparent.
